Posted by DavidDay on Jan 5, 2014 in Articles, Disaster Prep & Humanitarian Aid, Foreign Policy/Geopolitics, Korean Peninsula, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, Northeast Asia, Regional Security/Flashpoints | 0 comments
You might be asking yourself, “what difference does it make what the method of execution was for Uncle Jang Song Taek in North Korea?”
There is a distinction in the brutal savagery if, in fact, the dog-style execution was the case. The difference in the way that Jang died says something about Kim Jong Un and his power faction. It is one thing to be quickly snuffed by bullets while blindfolded at the stake, quite another to be torn apart rather more inhumanely, and probably more slowly, by vicious dogs. One says, “get rid of this threat to power, quickly and without remorse”. The latter says “eliminate this threat to power, with vengeance, delight in the human suffering, and provide a barbaric spectacle and lesson for others to witness and be intimidated by”.
If, in fact, the Uncle Jang’s execution was by dogs, that type of savagery is likely to be a “bridge too far” for this regime to stand. It blows the whole lie of a “Worker’s Paradise” completely out of the water and shoves factions within the country much closer to a “Peoples’ Power” tipping point.
So there is a huge difference that the method of execution makes. If it is the dog version, we had better be ready for a regime collapse and a humanitarian crisis the likes of which the world has not seen in recent times.Read More
Posted by DavidDay on Jan 4, 2014 in Blog, China, Critical National / Regional Security Issues, Foreign Policy/Geopolitics, Korean Peninsula, Military, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, Northeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Nuclear/uranium enrichment, Our Media, Regional Security/Flashpoints, Regional Security/Flashpoints, WMD/Chemical Weapons | 1 comment
The execution of the No. 2 leader in North Korea, Kim Jong Un’s Uncle Jang Song Taek, was beyond brutal–savage by any account. At the time that this broadcast was made, it was believed that Jang’s execution was by machine gunning him down while tied to a stake (this was the fate of Kim Jong Un’s former girlfriend). Some hours after the show was taped, we learned of an even more savage execution from the Singapore Straits Times (http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-report/china/story/jangs-execution-bodes-ill-china-20131224 )
“According to the report, unlike previous executions of political prisoners which were carried out by firing squads with machine guns, Jang was stripped naked and thrown into a cage, along with his five closest aides. Then 120 hounds, starved for three days, were allowed to prey on them until they were completely eaten up. This is called “quan jue”, or execution by dogs.
The report said the entire process lasted for an hour, with Mr Kim Jong Un, the supreme leader in North Korea, supervising it along with 300 senior officials.
The horrifying report vividly depicted the brutality of the young North Korean leader. The fact that it appeared in a Beijing- controlled newspaper showed that China no longer cares about its relations with the Kim regime.”
It is hard to imagine such savagery which puts it on a scale rivaled perhaps only by Pol Pot’s genocide, the Holocaust, and others of similar ilk. Whether or not the report is true, we shall have to wait and see but whether Jang was e executed by machine gun or by dogs, the result is the same–the former is less sensational.*
Jang’s execution means what for North Korea? Was there, in reality, a coup d’état or an attemped one? Was the Jang execution a good or bad? Was it necessary?
The North Korea policy wonks and observers are all over the map as to why this has happened and what it means for the future of the Hermit Kingdom. We turned to the fascinating perspective of an American who has recently returned from yet another trip to North Korea to understand what is actually going on on the ground. Patrick Border is an American citizen diplomat and veteran Hawaii North Korea traveler. We had an unusual conversation with Mr. Border as to the real “why” behind recent events in North Korea (Kenneth Bae, Merrill Newman and Dennis Rodman’s NBA exhibition game tryouts) and, in particular, Uncle Jang’s execution and its future implications.
During this interview, Mr. Border discusses the armed conflict within North Korea between the respective factions of economic reformer Jang and the North Korean military, with officers of military being killed. He talks about the instability of the Regime, the “overreaching” that Jang’s execution signals as well as the potential for steps towards a “People’s Power” tipping point in North Korea. Mr. Border emphasizes that Jang was North Korea’s point man for its relations with China and that relationship is now bitterly shattered and he reveals just what he has seen in Pyongyang that proves this. He left us with the ominous perspective that North Korean Regime is now isolated–even more than ever with its old mentor and protector, China, shut out–and that the shabby facade that the Regime holds up to the global community is crumbling, its dirty linen has been aired like never before, and there are now clear factions in North Korea with people forced to choose sides.
* On this particular point, you might be interested in a related piece on this website called, “Execution by dogs or machine guns: ‘What difference does it make?’” here.
Posted by DavidDay on Aug 19, 2013 in Articles, Blog, Foreign Policy/Geopolitics, Korean Peninsula, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea: The Cheonan Incident, Northeast Asia, Regional Security/Flashpoints | 0 comments
North Korea: “The Cheonan Sinking: Wounded Tiger vs. Crippled Child “
May 22, 2010.
On the receiving end of any spanking from Seoul and the U.S., North Korea actually has a split personality disorder. On the military side, it is like a wounded tiger. On the economic side, with an economy stumbling at roughly the Zimbawe level, North Korea is akin to a crippled, little child. Depending upon where you decide to spank, the policy types in Washington and Seoul get to choose between slapping the wounded tiger or kicking the already crippled, young child. They must understand clearly, if they choose to hit–the “where” and “how” have very different consequences and, like many North Korea issues, the correct strategy is not always obvious.Read More
Posted by DavidDay on Aug 19, 2013 in Articles, Blog, China, Foreign Policy/Geopolitics, Korean Peninsula, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea, North Korea: The Cheonan Incident, Northeast Asia, Regional Security/Flashpoints, The Cheonan Sinking | 0 comments
The Cheonan sinking is an important internal propaganda victory that Pyongyang created. With the loss of 46 South Korean sailors, Washington and Seoul had no choice. They took the bait. In so doing, they have predictably teed up the opportunity now for Kim Jong Il to do a little defense of the homeland frenzy. This internal, “Defense of the DPRK” propaganda barrage that now follows the Washington Seoul “spanking” is extremely valuable to the regime to enhance its stability at this delicate and difficult time of transition. The Dear Leader and his elite, inner circle know full well that, given Kim Jong Il’s 2008 stoke, his clock is already in overtime.
While we may never know for sure, the sinking of the Cheonan appears to be part of a deliberate teasing to coax a limited military response out of Seoul and Washington. Given the sophisticated, Kasparov-like chessmaster moves made by Pyongyang (typically outgunning U.S. negotiators concentrating on their checkers board), the Cheonan incident is just one of several moves coming up. Brinksmanship? Hardly. Pyongyang knows full well that at worst it faces a limited spanking response like perhaps joint military exercises (for show) or perhaps beefed up security between U.S and ROK forces on the peninsula combined with some rhetoric. Nothing more. Should Seoul engage in even the most benign cross-border military skirmish, Kim Jong Il can then get away with his slash back and propagandize that as blocking the aggressor from the South, no matter how minimal the “deterrent” response is from Washington and Seoul.
There is another piece to this already complicated puzzle. Kim Jong Il needs a leadership-anointing opportunity to assist his youngest son, the Swiss-educated Jong-Eun, to obtain some kind of military leadership, albeit limited, in defense of the fatherland. He also needs to cinch down the military power base for Jong-Eun. So how would this work? Whip the country and the KPA into a war frenzy, organize rallies in Pyongyang, put the KPA on alert, cut off trade and communications with the South. Perhaps even give “Brilliant Comrade ” (Jong-Eun) a military leadership role in the slash back exercise which can then be internally propagandized and then jerk him back to safety once the slash back has been undertaken. Military anointment completed and the internal film and propaganda machinery can then be unleashed. But before “Brilliant Comrade” is placed in the limited line of fire, the Dear Leader needed to test the waters and set up the U.S. an South Korean response. Hence, the Cheonan incident. The timing of this Cheonan chess move is not coincidental—the DPRK Party Congress is set to meet in a few weeks and it is likely that Kim Jong il will confirm then that the baton will pass to Jong-Eun.Read More